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SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISING FROM
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.
VII.
Questions Relating to Contraband of War.
By AMOS S.

HERSHEY,

Associate Professor of European History and Politics, Indiana University.

IN

the lastthat
issue
THEimportant
GREEN BAG
it was
questions
theofmost
stated
arising from the seizure of neutral vessels
by Russian crusiers-vi., those connected
with the great subject of contrabandwould be reserved for a separate discussion
in our next paper. This pledge we shall
now attempt to fulfil.
The Russo-Japanese war promises to
mark an important epoch in the history of
neutral rights and obligations, more par-

ticularly in definitely establishing the rights
of neutral commerce in respect to articles
ancipitis usus (double or dual use), and in extending the duties of neutral Governments
in respect to the use of neutral ports by belligerent armed vessels.'
On February Io, 1904, Japan published
the following list of contraband articles
which are divided into two classes corresponding to the English and American division into absolute and conditional contraband:-(i.) "lilitary weapons, amnunition,
explosives, and materials including lead, saltpetre, sulphur, etc., and machinery for making them, uniforms, naval and military, military accoutrements, armour-plated machincry and materials for construction or equipnent of ships of war, and all other goods
which, though not coming under this list,
are intended solely for use in war. Abovementioned articles will be regarded as contraband of war when passing through or destined
for enemy's army, navy or territory. (2.) Pro'This subject will be discussed in the next issue
of THE GREEN

BAG.

visions, drinks, horses, harness, fodder, vehicles, coal, timber, coins, gold and silver bullion, and materials for construction of telegraphs, telephones and railways. Abovementioned articles will be rcgarded as contraband of war when destined for enemy's army
or navy, or in such cases where, being goods arriving at enemy's territory, there is reason to
believe they are intended for use of enemy's
army or navy." 2
It will be seen from the above list that
Japan recognizes the English and American
doctrine of Conditional and Occasional
Contraband, so vigorously and (so it seems
'For this list which, so far as I am aware, has
not been reprinted by any American newspaper,
see London Times (weekly ed.) for February 26,
1904. Cf. list published in Appendix VII. of Takahashi's Cases on International Law During the
Chino-Japanese War. See also lists found in the
Manual of Naval Prize Law (p. 20),. drawn up by
Professor Holland of Oxford in 1888 for the use
of the British Admiralty, and Art. i of the
Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, issued by the United States Government on June

20, 1898. (See Appendix III. in Snow's International Law. The list given in the Instructions
has also been incorporated into Stockton's Naval
War Code.) These lists, which are those of the
leading modern maritime nations who have the
power to enforce their decrees, may be considOne looks' in
ered as the most authoritative.
vain for agreement or consistency in treaties and

amongst the authorities or publicists; but it is
certainly fortunate that the leading maritime nations of the world (excepting France and Germany, perhaps), are in substantial agreement in
regard to the question as to what articles may
be dealt with as contraband of war. France can
scarcely be cited any longer as favoring the restriction of contraband to arms and ammunition

since her attempt to make rice absolute contraband in 1885. In 187o Germany remonstrated
strongly with the English Government for permitting the export of coal to France.

Some Questions of InternalionalLaw.
to the writer) vainly denied or denounced
by many Continental publicists.'
'The English and American doctrine of conditional or occasional (sometimes also called accidental) contraband is based upon the Grotian division of commodities into three classes: (i) Articles of direct and immediate use in war, such
as arms and ammunition which are always contraband when they have a belligerent destination;
things absolutely useless in warfare, such as
(2)
millinery and pianos, which are never contraband
under any circumstances; (3) res ancipitis ususthings of double or dual use, i.e., equally useful
in war or peace, such as coal, horses, provisions,
cloth, etc. It is to this latter class that the English and American doctrine of conditional or occasional contraband has been applied, i. e., they
are only to be considered contraband, and, therefore, as subject to prehmption or confiscation,
when destined to a port under blockade, a place
besieged, or when clearly intended for the direct
and immediate use of the army or navy of one of
the belligerents. In any case, whether in the case
of absolute or conditional contraband, a belligerent destination, either immediate or ultimate, is
essential. It need not necessarily be a belligerent port. (See The Commercen, i Wheaton Rep.
382.) For leading cases on the doctrine of conditional or occasional contraband, see The Staat
Embden, 1798, iC. Robinson, 26 (masts); The Endraught, 1798, iC. Rob. 22 (timber); The Jonge
Margaretha, 1799, iC. Rob. i89 (cheese); The Jonge
Tobias, 1799, iC. Rob. 329 (tar); The Sarah Christina, 1799, iC. Rob. 237, 241 (tar and pitch); The

Ringende Jacob, 1798, 3C. Rob. 86 (hemp and iron
bars); The Neptunus, 18oo, 3C. Rob. io8 (sailcloth); The Commercen, 1816, I Wheaton 382 (provisions), and The Peterhoff, 1866, 5 Wallace 28, 58.
The doctrine of conditional or occasional contraband is strongly opposed or denounced by
Hautefeuille
publicists.
Continental
many

(Droits des Neutres, Tit. VIII., sect. II, 3), who

relies upon an imaginary loi primitive to prove his
case, claims that contraband is confined to arms
and munitions of war or to articles expressly and
uniquely destined for warlike use. (See also his
Histoire du Droit Maritime International p. 433.)
Ortolan (Dip. de la Mer, II., pp. i9of) is of the
"opinion of those who think that the freedom of
neutral commerce ought to furnish the general
principle, to which only such restrictions should
be applied as are an immediate and necessary
consequence of the state of war between the belligerents;" but he is willing, by way of exception,
to make certain concessions to belligerents, "in
view of some special circumstances affecting
Klfiber (§288) also
their military operations."
admits the existence of doubtful cases which
must be governed by surrounding circumstances.
Bluntschli (§805) admits that such objects as
"clothing, money, horses, timber for naval construction, sail-cloth, iron plates, engines, coal,
and merchant vessels" (he does not include foodstuffs in this list) may "exceptionally be regarded
as contraband of war expressly sanctioned by
treaty, or if,in a particular case. it can be
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Russia, on the other hand, published on
February 28, 19o4, an extensive list of contraband in which the distinction between arshown that they are destined to be used in an
existing war, and that they are carried to one of
the belligerents with the intention of rendering
(For criticism of the doctrine of the
him aid."
intent of the owner as applied to contraband, see
Kleen, Contrebande de guerre, pp. 37-43.)
Heffter (§ 16o) admits the existence of articles
of occasional or conditional contraband "in treaties and in the special regulations of several
countries," and adds that "a belligerent can only
interfere with them when neutral trade, in conveying them to the enemy, affords to the latter,
The
succour of a manifestly hostile nature."
Russian De Martens (Traite, III., p. 351), who
defines contraband as "objects which a neutral
vessel is attempting to deliver (cherche t faire
cntrer) upon the territory of one of the belligerent States" (which objects, he declares, may always be seized), admits that "those (objects)
which are not of direct service in war may also
be seized in exceptional cases according to the
character and destination of the cargo and, in
circumdeterminate
general, under certain
Kleen (Contrebande de guerre, pp. i
stances."
and 29) would limit the seizure and confiscation
of articles as contraband of war to "munitions of
war properly so called, i. e., objects expressly
made for war or immediately and specially serviceable for warlike use in their actual state," and
to "things which enter into the composition of
such objects, if it be sufficient to re-unite them
or to place them into juxtapo3ition without any
other labor, transformation, or improvement."
It will thus be seen that all of the Continental
publicists cited above, with the exception of Hantefeuille and Kleen (the latter of whom seems to
be the only thoroughly logical and consistent opponent of the doctrine of conditional and occasional contraband), practically concede the principle underlying the British and American contention, viz., that articles of dual or double use
may, under certain circumstances (e. g., if destined for military use), be seized and confiscated
as contraband of war. Their criticism seems in
reality to be directed against some of the ways
in which the doctrine has been applied by English and American prize courts rather than
against the principle or doctrine in itself.
It should be noted that the Institute of International Law, in its session at Vienna in 1896, attempted to abolish what it called relative and accidental contraband as applied to articles ancipitis
usus, and limited contraband of war to (i) arms
of every kind, (2) munitions of war and explosives, (3) military material such as objects of
equipment, uniforms, gun-carriages, etc., (4) vessels equipped for war, (5) instruments especially
made for the immediate manufacture of munitions of war. But the belligerent is permitted, at
the risk of having to pay indemnity, to preempt or sequester objects which, taken on their
way to an enemy port, may serve equally for warlike or pacific usage. See Annaire, XVI., p. 205.
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as follows:-

others which may be used for a warlike purpose, if they are transported on the account
of, or are destined for, the eneniv

i. Small arms of every kind, and guns,
mounted or in sections, as well as armour

'This version, which differs somewhat from
that published in the American newspapers, is the

plates.

one given by T. J. Lawrence in his recent work,
War and Neutrality in the Far East, pp. 152-53.
The meaning of the words others and enemy in

ticles absolutely and conditionally contraband was apparently ignored. This list was

Ammunition for fire-arms, such as
projectiles, shell-fuses, bullets, priming, cartridges, cartridge-cases, powder, saltpetre,
sulphur.
3. Explosives and materials for causing
explosions, such as torpedoes, dynamite,
pyroxyline, various explosive substances,
wire conductors, and everything used to explode mines and torpedoes.
4.
Artillery, engineering, and camp
equipment, such as gun carriages, ammunition wagons, boxes or packages of cartridges, field kitchens and forges, instruinent wagons, pontoons, bridge trestles,
barbed wire, harness, etc.
5. Articles of military equipment and
clothing, such as bandoliers, cartridgeboxes, knap-sacks, straps, cuirasses, entrenching tools, drums, pots and pans, saddles, harness, completed parts of military
uniforms, tents, etc.
6. Vessels bound for an enemy's port,
even if under a neutral commercial flag, if
it is apparent from their construction, interior fittings, and other indications that
they have been built for warlike purposes,
and are proceeding to an enemy's port in
order to be sold or handed over to the enCnlv.
7. ],oilers and every kind of naval machinery, mounted or unmounted.
8. Every kind of fuel, such as coal, naphtha, alcohol and other similar materials.
9. Articles and material for the installation of telegraphs, telephones, or for the
construction of railroads.
to. Generally, everything intended for
warfare bv sea or land, as well as rice, provisions and horses, beasts of burden and
2.

article io are ambiguous. As Secretary Hay says
in his note of August 30, 1904, which contains the

protest of the United States against the decision
of the Russian prize court at Vladivostok in the'
case of the Arabia, to Mr. McCormick. our ambassador at St. Petersburg:
"The ambiguity of meaning which characterizes
the language of this clause, lending itself to a
double interpretation, left its real intendment

doubtful. The vagueness of the language, used in
so important a matter, where a just regard for

the rights of neutral commerce required that it
should be clear and explicit, could not fail to excite inquiry among American shippers, who, left
in doubt as to the significance attributed by His
Imperial Majesty's Government to the word

'enemy'-incertain as to whether it meant 'enemy
government or forces' or 'enemy ports or territory'-have been compelled to refuse the ship-

ment of goods of any character to Japanese ports.
The very obscurity of the terms used seemed to
contain a destructive menace, even to legitimate

American commerce.
"In the interpretation of clause 5 of article io,
and having regard to the traditional attitude of
His Imperial Majesty's Government, as well as to
the established rule of International Law. with respect to goods which a belligerent may or may
not treat as contraband of war, it seemed to the
Government of the United States incredible that
the word aures (others), or the word l'enemi
(enemy), could be intended to include as contraband of war foodstuffs, fuel, cotton and all other
articles destined to Japanese ports, irrespective
of the question whether they were intended for
the support of a non-conibatant population or for
the use of the military or naval forces. In its circular of June io last, communicated by you to
the Russian Governlmlent, the department interpreted the word enemy in a mitigated sense. as
well as in accordai with the enlightened and huinane principles of International Law. and. therefore, it treated the word enemy, as used in the
context, as lleaning 'enemy government or
forces,' and not the 'enemy ports or territory.'
'But if a benign interpretation was placed on
the language used, it is because such an interpretation was due to the Russian Government, between whom and the United States a most valued
and unbroken friendship has always existed, and
it was no less due to the commerce of the latter,
inasmuch as the broad interpretation of the language used would imply a total inhibition of legitimate commerce between Japan and the United
States, which it would be impossible for the latter to acquiesce in.
"Whatever doubt could exist as to the meaning
of the Imperial Order has been apparently re-

Some Quesions of In/ernalionzalLaw.
To this list raw cotton was added by Imperial Order on April 21, 1904.
In the publication of this extensive list )I
articles (all of which she seems to have regarded as absolutely contraband) and still
more in her subequent conduct, Russia not
only showed that she intended to ignore the
doctrine of Conditional or Occasional Contraband, but she included in her list of
things absolutely contraband many articles
of ancipitis usus, such as coal, rice, horses,
provisions, telegraph and railway material,
etc. These have always hitherto been regarded either as not contraband at all, or,
if so, as subject to preemption or confiscation only in certain contingencies or under
when destined
certain circumstances, c.
for a blockaded port, a place besieged, or
when obviously intended for, or liable to fall
into the possession of, the army or navy of
the enemy. Russia will thus be seen to have
gone farther than any belligerent has ever
gone, at least since the time of the Napoleonic wars, in the direction of a real or
threatened attack upon the rights and interests of neutral commerce. "The Russian
Government, which more than a century
ago was the foremost champion of the freedom of neutral commerce, put forth for, we
believe, the first time in the history of civilized warfare the amazing pretension that ill
such goods should be considered contral)and regardless of destination or circuinstances." '
The publication of this list drew forth
moved by the inclostire in your dispatch of the
note from Count lamsdorff, stating tersely and
simply the sentence of the prize court. The cominunication of the decision was made in unqualified terms, and the department is, therefore, con-

strained to take notice of the principle on which
the condemnation is based and which it is impossible for the United States to accept, as indicat-

ing either a principle of law or a policy which a
belligerent State may lawfully enforce or pursue
toward the United States as a neutral."-Reprinted from the Washington Star for September
22, 1904.

'From an editorial in the New York Tribune
for August 9. 1904.
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some severe criticism on the part of the
English and American press, and what appears to have been an informal or semiofficial protest on the part of our State Department at Washington,2 but it was not
before the month of June that the American and British Governments took formal
action. The British Government appears to
have entered its first formal protest against
Russia's inclusion of rice and other foodstuffs in her list of contraband earlv in
June. :' On June jo, 1904, Secretary Hay
sent the following circular 4 (which we reprodce in full because of its importance
and because it serves to set forth the American p)osition on the subject of contraband,
together with the main arguments with
which this view has been supported by one
of our greatest statesmen) to American
Ambassadors in Europe:
Department of State,
Washington, D. C., June lO, 19o4.
To the Ambassadors of the United States
in Europe:
Gentlemen: It appears from public documents that coal, naphtha, alcohol and
other fuel have been declared contraband
of war by the Russian Government. These
'"'In regard to the Russian declaration of foodstuffs as contraband, it is said at the State Department that the destination of such goods must
determine their character. If they are intended
for either army they are contraband and subject
to seizure. If they are intended for the use of
civilians, except in the case of besieged towns,
they must not be seized, or if seized, they must
be paid for." See New York Timcs for March
I, 1904.

':See c. g., St. Petersburg dispatch of June 12,
in New York Times.
'This

circular was not, however, made public

before August 9, 1904. The British protest, which
has not been published, so far as I am aware, is
stated by the Associated Press to have been
along the saue lines as the American Circular.
But the British protest appears to have been directed mainly against the inclusion of foodstuffs
as contraband, whereas Secretary Hay confines
himself mainly to coal and cotton. For his reasons, see his note of August 30, 1904.
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articles enter into general consumption in
the arts of peace, to which they are vitally
necessary. They are usually treated, not as
"absolutely contraband of war," like articles
that are intended primarily for military purposes in time of war, such as ordnance,
arms, ammunition, etc., but rather as "conditional contraband," that is to say, articles
that may be used for or converted to the
purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances. They may be rather classed
with provisions and foodstuffs of ordinarily
innocent use, but which may become absolutely contraband of war when actually and
especially destined for the military or naval
forces of the enemy.
In the war between the United States
and Spain the Navy Department General
Orders No. 492, issued June 20, 1898, declared, in Article I9, as follows: "The term
contraband of war comprehends only articles having a belligerent destination."
Among articles absolutely contraband it declared ordnance, machine guns and other
articles of military or naval warfare. It declared as conditional contraband "coal,
when destined for a naval station, a port of
call or a ship or ships of the enemy." -It
likewise declared provisions to be conditionally contraband "when destined for the
enemy's ship or ships, for a place that is besieged."
The above rules as to articles absolutely
or conditionally contraband of war were
adopted in the naval war code, promulgated
by the Navy Department June 27, 1900.
While it appears that the document mentioned that rice, foodstuffs, horses, beasts of
burden, and other animals which may be
used in time of war are declared to be contraband of war only when they are transported for account of or destined to the
enemy, yet all kinds of fuel, such as coal,
naphtha, alcohol, are classified along with
arms, ammunition and other articles intended for warfare on land or sea.

The test in determining whether articles
ancipitis usus are contraband of war is their
destination for military uses of a belligerent.
Mr. Dana, in his notes to Wheaton's "International Law," says:
"The chief circumstance of inquiry, would
naturally be the port of destination. If that.
is a naval arsenal, or a port in which vessels
of war are usually fitted out, or in which a
fleet is lying, or a garrison town, or a place
from which a military expedition is fitted
out-the presumption of military use would
be raised, more or less strongly, according
to circumstances."
In the wars of 1859 and 1870 coal was declared by France not to be contraband.
During the latter war Great Britain held
that the character of coal depended upon its
destination, and refused to permit vessels to
sail with it to the Spanish fleet in the North
Sea. Where coal or other fuel is shipped to
a port of a belligerent, with no presumption
against its specific use, to condemn it as absolutely contraband would seem to be an extreme measure.
Mr. Hall, "International Law," says:
"During the West African conference in
1884 Russia took occasion to dissent vigorously from the inclusion of coal among art'cles contraband of war, and declared that
she would categorically refuse her consent to
any articles in any treaty, convention or iistrument whatever, which would imply its
recognition as such."
We are also informed that it is intended
to treat raw cotton as a contraband of war.
While it is true raw cotton could be made
into clothing for the military uses of a belligerent, a military use for the supply of the
army or garrison might possibly be made of
foodstuffs of every description which might
be shipped from neutral ports to the nonblockaded ports of a belligerent. The principle under consideration might, therefore,
be extended so as to apply to every article

Some Questiois of InlernalionalLaw,
of human use which might be declared contraband of war simply because it might ultimately become in any degree useful to a
belligerent for military purposes.
Coal or other fuel and cotton are applied
for a great many innocent purposes. Many
nations are dependent on them for the conduct of inoffensive industries, and no sufficient presumption of an intended warlike
use seems to be afforded by the mere fact
of their destination to a belligerent port.
The recognition in principle of the treatment
of coal and other fuel and raw cotton as absolutely contraband of war might ultimately
lead to a total inhibition of the sale by neutrals to the people of belligerent States of
all articles which could be finally converted
to military uses. Such an extension of the
principle by treating coal and all other fuel
and raw cotton as absolute contraband of
war simply because they are shipped by a
neutral to a lion-blockaded port of a belligerent would not appear to be in accord
with the reasonable and lawful rights of a
neutral commerce. I am, your obedient
servant,
JOHN HAY.'
Fortuilately for Russia and the neutral
nations, the Russians had no opportunity of
making a practical application of their views
on the subject of contraband until after the
capture of several neutral vessels in the
Pacific by the Vladivostok squadron during
the months of June and July, 1904.2 The
'The comment of the British and American
newspapers (including those of the political opponents of the Administration) upon the position

taken by Secretary Hay in this circular appears

to have been uniformly favorable.
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first case which aroused controversy was
that of the British collier Allanton which
was captured in the straits of Korea on her
return voyage from a Japanese port, while
conveying Japanese commercial (anthracite)
coal from Japan to Singapore. One of the
grounds on which the vessel was condemned was that she had carried contraband (Welsh) coal to Japan on her outward
voyage, i. e., the Allanton appears to have
been condemned for a past, not a present offence. The British Government refused to interfere at the time on the ground that, inasmuch as an appeal to the Admiralty court
at St. Petersburg had been allowed, the case
was still sub judicc3
If the facts alleged by those interested in
the fate of the Allanton are correct, there can
be no question but that Russia has been
guilty of a serious violation of the law of
contraband in condemning the vessel for an
offence supposed to have been committed
on her outward voyage. As Lord Stowell
said in the case of the Iinina 4 "the articles
must be taken in delicto, in the actual prosecution of the voyage to an enemy's port.5
'On the Allanton case, see especially letter of
W. R. Rea, the owner of the Allanton, in the London Times (weekly ed.) for September 2, 1904,
and the letter from the British Foreign Office to
Mr. Stanley Mitcalfe in the London Times (weekly) for August 26, 1904. Some of the grounds
given by the Russians for the condemnation of
the vessel were very trivial, as, e. g., that she had
a Japanese cabin boy on board, that the official
log-book had not been entered up properly, etc.
A more serious charge was that her papers were
irregular. The Allanton has since (October 29.

been released by the Admiralty Court of
St. Petersburg.
43 Rob. I68.
1904,)

I have been

'This is the general rule, but there are excep-

the general-chorus of approval.
'As has been noted in a previous paper, the
neutral colliers seized and detained as prizes in
the Red Sea during the second week of the war
were released in response to an order of the
Czar's on the ground that these captures had
been made before the formal declaration of coal
as contraband of war. The later Red Sea seizures were decided on other grounds than. that of
their alleged carriage of contraband. See THE

tions. In 1816 the cargo of the Commercen, a
Swedish vessel, was condemned by the Supreme
Court of the United States because it was intended for the British fleet lying in a Spanish
port during the War of 1812. The cases to which
the doctrine of continuous voyage has been applied may also be said to constitute exceptions to
this rule.
In any case, the real or ultimate
destination must be a hostile one. The case of
the Allanton cannot be brought under any of these
heads.
Her destination appears to have been
really as well as nominally neutral.

unable to detect a single dissenting voice amidst

GREEN BAG

for October, 1904.
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Under the present understanding of the law
of nations you cannot generally take the
1
proceeds on the return journey."
The most important cases bearing on the
subject of contraband which have so far 2
arisen during the present war are those of
the Knight Comnander," the Arabia, and the

Caichas-all of which are cases of prizes
captured by the Vladivostok squadron in
the latter part of July, 19o4.
The Knight Conunauder was a British
steamer with a general cargo including flour
and railway material from New York consigned to various Eastern ports,vi"., Manila,
Shanghai and Yokohama. She was sunk
and afterwards condemned by a Russian
prize court. The questions involved in her
destruction as a neutral prize have been discussed in a previous paper.4 Our conclus'The rule is different in the case of an attempted breach of blockade, in which case the
outward and return voyages are regarded as
parts of one transaction and the offence clings to
the blockade runner during the return voyage.
See Lord Stowell's decision in the case of the
Jut/row Maria Shroeder, 3 Rob. 153. But in the
case of contraband the return voyage is regarded
as a separate and, therefore, innocent expedition.
In the case of the Nancy (3 Rob. 127), Lord Stowellheld that the return voyage will not be regarded as a separate and innocent expedition if
the "outward and homeward voyages are but
parts of one transaction, conducted by the same
persons and planned from the beginning as one
adventure, and if on the outward voyage contraband goods and fraudulent papers are carried."
Cited by Lawrence, Principles, p. 616. But, as
Lawrence says, "it is somewhat doubtful whether
this view would be acted upon at the present
time. Continental publicists condemn it as an
undue extension of belligerent rights, and the
British Admiralty Manual contents itself with the
statement that a commander should detain a vessel he meets on her return voyage with such a
record as we have described behind her." See
Holland's Manual, pp. 23-24.
2
October 5, 1904.
"The German steamer Thea, which was sunk
by the Vladivostok fleet at about the same time
as the Knight Commander, is omitted because no
facts have come to light which would make a
discussion of this case profitable, or even possible. No question appears to have been raised regarding the legality of the capture of the CheltenIt was said to have been
ham early in June.
caught in the act of conveying railway sleepers to
Korea.
'See THE GREEN. BAG for October, 1904.

ion was that there existed, under the
circumstances, no justification for her
destruction, even if she carried contraband. The question of apology and
indemnity for the destruction of the vessel is one which primarily concerns the
British Government, but the American
owners of the cargo would in any case seem
to be entitled to compensation or restitutioin
even in the case of such portion of her cargo
as consisted of contraband, inasmttch as it
was illegally destroyed before condemnation by a properly constituted prize court.'
The cases of the Arabia and the Caichas
may conveniently be considered in connection with each other.

German

The Arabia was a

vessel with a cargo

composed

largely of American flour and railway material (steel rails) consigned to Hong
Kong and Japanese ports. There appears
5
1t was reported at the trial that a letter book,
which was found in the captain's cabin, contained
copies of correspondence, proving that the cargo
(probably the railway material) on board the
Knight Commander was really destined for Chemulpo. In that case, its confiscation as contraband of war by a prize court would have been entirely justifiable. See London Tiies (weekly ed.)
for August 12, 1904.

'The Arabia appears, at the time of her seizure, to have been on her way to the neutral port
of Hong Kong, but this fact would by no means
save her cargo from condemnation if it could be
shown that its real or ultimate destination was a
belligerent one. The doctrine of continuous voyage has, however, no applicability to this case.
and, strangely enough, no case calling for its application seems thus far (October 5, 1904,) to

have arisen.

The doctrine is undoubtedly sound

in principle, although liable to great abuse in
practice.
The doctrine of continuous voyage was first
applied to contraband by a French prize court
(in the case of the Vrou Houwina) during the
Crimean War in 1855, but it did not attract gen-

eral attention until the extension and publicity

given to the doctrine by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of
Peterhoif, etc.). at the close of the Civil War. The
doctrine in question was approved by the Italian
Council of Prizes in 1896 (in the case of the
Doelwyk), and was sanctioned by the Institute of
International Law at its session in Venice the
same year. The attempt of England to enforce
the doctrine (in the cases of the Bundesrath, etc.,)
during the Boer War in i9oo failed, however, owing to the determined opposition of Germany. On

Some Questions of InternationalLaw.
to have been no evidence that either the
flour or the railway material was intended
for the use of the Japanese Government.'
The cargo was shipped in the ordinary
course of trade from Portland, Oregon, and
was consigned to private individuals (merchants) in Yokohama.
The Russian prize court at Vladivostok,
which gave its decision in the latter part of
July, condemned such portion of the cargo
(flour and railway material) of the Arabia as
had been consigned to Japanese ports; but
the vessel together with the remainder of
the cargo (which consisted of flour consigned to Hong Kong and which included
more than one-half of its bulk and weight)
was released.

2

The Calchas was a British steamer with a
cargo of flour, raw cotton, lumber and machinery" shipped from Tacoma and consigned to Yokohama, Kobe, Hong Kong
and Europe. As in the case of the Arabia,
it is claimed by the owners of the cargo4
that the commodities shipped to Japanese
ports were consigned to private individuals
and that they were in no wise intended for
the consumption of the Japanese army or
navy. The decision of the local Russian prize
court at Vladivostok

was the same as in

"Continuous Voyage as Applied to Contraband,"
see especially Westlake in Law Quarterly Review

X\v., pp. 24-32; Woolsey in Outlook, Vol. 94, PP.
j67ff, and Baty, International Law in South Africa.
ch. i. The latter is an extremely able attack on
the doctrine. Mr. Baty, at least, shows that it is
liable to great abnse.
'It was claimed at the time that the railway
material, although primarily to be landed at a
Japanese port, was to be transhipped thence to
Chemulpo in Korea. where it was to be used in
the construction of a railway by the Japanese
Government; but the cargo does not appear to
have been condemned on this ground.
'See New York Times for August 4, 1904.
"The cotton and machinery are said to have
been of a strictly commercial character.
'See letter of A. Holt and Company in the London Times (weekly). for August 26, 1904.
'See New York Times for September 15, 1904.
The Calchas was captured in the latter part of
July and arrived at Vladivostok on August 8, but
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the case of the Arabia. The vessel together
with that part of the cargo consigned to
neutral ports was released, but that portion
of the cargo which had been consigned to
Japanese ports was condenned."
The only attemptedl justification of these
decisions is the following semi-official statement by a high Russian official to the Associated Press:
"Foodstuff consigned to an enemy's port
in sufficient quantity to create the prcsumi'tion that it is intended for the use of the
Government's

military or naval forces

is

the decision of the prize court was not rendered
before September 13.
The Calchas was, however, detained at Vladivostok until October 28, i.e., a month and a half
after she should have been released, on the plea
of the Russian Crown Advocate that she had carried mail matter from the United States to Japan
containing information of special value to the
enemy addressed to Japanese officials. This fact
was not made public until October 9, when it was
learned that several of the Pacific mail steamship
lines had notified the Postmaster-General at
Washington that they would hereafter refuse to
carry United States mail addressed to Japan. It
was subsequently learned that the mail bags of
the Calchas had been opened by Russian officials
and that the contents of four registered mail sacks
had not only been opened, but removed. The
bags were then resealed and forwarded to Japan
after considerable delay. Among the letters lost
are said to have been some diplomatic communications (which are privileged) from the Japanese
Minister at Washington. It was also reported
on October 34 that a pouch containing private
or domestic mail for the United States cruiser
Cincinmati, then at Nagasaki, Japan, had been
opened, subsequently resealed, and then sent on
to itsdestination
We are not informed as to the action taken
by our State Department at Washington with
regard to this matter, but if the facts have been
correctly stated, there can be no doubt but that
Russia has been guilty of a clear violation of the
International Postal Union treaty, as well as of
International Law. However far the belligerent
right of search of neutral mail steamers and confiscation of noxious mail matter may extend, it
cannot possibly be made to justify the detention
of a mail steamer under such circumstances. The
law bearing on this subject has already been discussed in a previous article of this series. See
TnE GREEN BAG for October, 1904.
'In both cases an appeal has been taken to
the higher Admiralty Court at St. Petersburg,
which may be expected to reverse the decisions
of the local court in view of the recent concessions, in p~rinciple, made by the Russian Government to Great Britain and the United States.
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prima facie contraband and sufficient to warrant holding it for the decision of a prize
court. Even if consigned to private firms,
the burden of proof that it is not intended
for the Government rests upon the consignor and consignee. If it can be proved
that it is intended for non-combatants it
will not be confiscated. Small consignments
of foodstuff in mixed cargoes will be considered presumptively to be regular trade
shipments and will not be seized as. contraband." 1
On August 16 the British Government addressed a strongly-worded protest to the
Russian Government against the Russian
view of contraband, as also against the sinking of neutral merchantmen by Russian
warships. In respect to contraband, Great
Britain pointed out the distinction between
conditioned and absolute contraband, and
"with regard to foodstuffs consigned to a
belligerents' port," it was maintained that
"proof is necessary that the goods are intended for the belligerent's naval or military forces before they can be considered as
contraband." 2
On August 18, 19o4 the United States
Government protested vigorously against
the confiscation of American flour and railway material on board the Arabia. Secretary Hay, after remarking that the "judgment of confiscation appears to be founded
on the mere fact that the goods in question
were bound for Japanese ports and addressed to various commercial houses in
said ports," observed that "in view of its
well-known attitude, it should hardly seem
'From the New York Times for August 7, 1904.
2

See London Times (weekly ed.) for August
The British position in respect to foodstuffs was thus stated by Lord Salisbury at the
beginning of the Boer War: "Foodstuffs with a
hostile destination can be considered contraband
of war only if they are supplied for the enemy's
forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable
of being so used: it must be shown that this was,
in fact, their destination at the time of seizure."
26, 1904.

necessary to say that the Government of the
United States is unable to admit the validity
of the judgment, which appears to have
been rendered in disregard of the settled
law of nations in respect to what constitutes
contraband of war."
After calling attention to the ambiguity
of the Russian Imperial Order of February
28, in respect to the word "enemy," 3 Mr.
Hay thus explained the attitude of the
United States in respect to telegraphic, telephonic and railway material:
"With respect to articles and material for
telegraphic and telephonic installations, unnecessary hardship is imposed by treating
them all as contraband of war-even those
articles which are evidently and unquestionably intended for merely domestic or industrial uses. With respect to railway materials, the judgment of the court appears tco
proceed in plain violation of the terms of the
imperial order, according to which they are
to be deemed to be contraband of war only
if intended for the construction of railways.
The United States government regrets that
it could not concede that telegraphic, telephonic and railway materials are confiscable
simply because destined to the open commercial ports of a belligerent."
This great master of International Law
and Diplomacy then proceeds to furnish an
explanation of the nature of contraband
which we may accept as authoritative:
"When war exists between powerful
States it is vital to the legitimate maritime
commerce of neutral States that there be
no relaxation of the rule-no deviation from
the criterion-for determining what constitutes contraband of war, lawfully subject tc
belligerent capture, namely, warlike nature,
use and destination. Articles which, like
arms and ammunition, are by their nature
of self-evident warlike use are contraband
"See note cited above.

Some Queslions of InternalionalLaw.
,of war if destined to enemy territory; but
articles which, like coal, cotton and provisions, though ordinarily innocent, are
-capable of warlike use, are not subject to
capture and confiscation unless shown by
evidence to be actually destined for the military or naval forces of a belligerent.
"This substantive principle of the law of
nations can not be overridden by a technical rule of the prize court that the owners of
the captured cargo must prove that no part
of it may eventually come to the hands of
the enemy forces. The proof is of an impossible nature; and it cannot be admitted that
the absence of proof, in its nature impossible to make, can justify the seizure and condemnation. If it were otherwise, all neutral
commerce with the people of a belligerent
State would be impossible; the innocent
would suffer inevitable condemnation with
the guilty.
"The established principle of discrimination between contraband and non-contraband goods admits of no relaxation or refinement. It must be either inflexibly adhered to or abandoned by all nations. There
is and can be no middle ground. The criterion of warlike usefulness and destination
has been adopted by the common consent
of civilized nations, after centuries of struggle, in which each belligerent made indiscriminate warfare upon all commerce of all
neutral States with the people of the other
belligerent, and which led to reprisals as the
mildest available remedy."
The logical results of the new Russian
doctrine are thus summarized:
"If the principle which appears to have
been declared by the Vladivostok prize
court and which has not so far been disavowed or explained by his Imperial Majesty's Government is acquiesced in, it means,
if carried into full execution, the complete
destruction of all neutral commerce with the
non-combatant population of Japan; it obvi-
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ates the necessity of blockades; it renders
meaningles s the principle of the declaration
of Paris set forth in the imperial order of
February 29 last, that a blockade in order to
be obligatory must be effective; it obliterates all distinction between commerce in
contraband and non-contraband goods; and
is in effect a declaration of war against commerce of every description between the
people of a neutral and those of a belligerent State." And he closes with the following
protest on the part of the United States:
"You will express to Count Lamsdorff the
deep regret and grave concern with which
the government of the United States has
received his unqualified communication of
the decision of the prize court; you will
make earnest protest against it and say that
the government of the United States regrets
its complete inability to recognize the principle of that decision, and still less to acquiesce in it as a policy. I have the honor
to be, sir, your obedient servant,
"JOHN HAY."'

In her reply of September 16 to the British protest on the subject of contraband,
Russia is reported as having informed the
British Government that the Russian Government had "agreed to view as of a conditionally contraband character foodstuffs
and fuel,2 and that supplementary instructions had been issued to the Russian naval
commanders and prize courts, calling attention to the misinterpretation which had
been placed upon the (Russian) prize regula'The Hay note or protest of August 30, 1904,
which will take rank as one of the best and most
authoritative utterances on the law of contraband,
has, so far as I am aware, been published in full
by only one American newspaper-the Washington Star, September 22, 1904. For an excellent
summary, see the New York Sun for September
21, 1904.
'There appears to be some doubt as to whether the Russian reply is specific or satisfactory in
respect to fuel. The question of the contraband
character of coal was not directly raised by the
Russian prize court decisions.
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trade to private
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band," but upon this point a distinct reser-

vation is made. "The simple fact of consignment to private persons does not preclude the possibility that the articles are ultimately destined for belligerent forces, and
Russia insists that it be not necessarily regarded as conclusive evidence of the innocent character of the goods." This reservation is entirely proper. But Russia admits
that in such cases the burden of proof rests
upon the captor. This is a capital point.
The answer of Russia to the American
,protest was received on September 19 and
is said to follow generally the lines of her
reply to Great Britain. Count Lamsdorff
stated that instructions had been sent to the
prize courts and naval commanders supplementing and explaining the regulations respecting contraband of war originally is'New York Times for September 17, 1904. This
communication was made verbally by Count
Lamsdorff to the British Ambassador Hardinge
at St. Petersburg. itwill not involve, it is said,
any public amendment of the Russian contraband
and prize regulations, but it implies a new official
interpretation of these regulations. As such it is
binding upon Russian prize courts and naval
commanders. Russia thus "saves her face" by not
makino" a public surrender of her former position.

sued. The conditional contraband character of articles of dual use is admitted in the
new instructions. If articles of dual use are
addressed to private individuals in Japan
they will not be subject to seizure and confiscation unless private individuals are
shown to be agents or contractors of the
2
military or naval authorities of Japan.
It will thus be seen that Russia has apparently accepted in principle the contention of
the American and British Governments that
articles ancipitis usus are only subject to
confiscation when consigned to places under
siege, blockaded ports, or when clearly destined for the military or naval forces of one
of the belligerents, and that they are not
subject to seizure and confiscation merely
because they are consigned t-) a belligerent
port, at least in respect to provisions. The
decisions of the Russian prize court at Vlad
ivostok will probably be reversed by the
Admiralty Court at St. Petersburg, at least,
in respect to the confiscation of flour, in the
cases of the Arabia and the Calchas, and we
have a right to expect that the conduct of
Russian naval commanders and prize courts
will be more circumspect in the future.
"New York Times for September 20, 1904Nothing seems to ha.e been said by Russia regarding machinery and railway material.

